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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes between the United States and Cuba have caused
tensions between the two countries since Fidel Castro’s
government took power in Cuba in 1959.1 Opposing that
government, the United States maintained a trade embargo
against Cuba since 1962, and refused to grant diplomatic
recognition until recently under the Obama administration.2
New developments under the Obama administration and
the opening of the U.S. embassy on Cuban soil point to the
possibility of a higher degree of cooperation between the
two countries than there has been in the past. As Cuban
economic conditions continue to deteriorate and out-
migration does not decline, the possibility of an end to the
trade embargo and repaired relations with the United States
could suggest a major political transformation in Cuba.
In order for Cuba to complete a transition into a post-
socialist market economy, any future government must
address claims for expropriated property that arose out of
the revolution in 1959. In order to evaluate issues and
problems that could arise for Cuba, it is important to take
into consideration other post-socialist and post-communist
governments in order to have reference points. This paper
will look to some of the governments in post-communist
Eastern Europe in order to evaluate possible property
1 Kern Alexander and Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-
Socialist Cuba, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 137, 137 (1996).
2 Id. at 138.
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restoration schemes for Cuba. Different schemes include
compensation laws, restitution laws, and an argument for
privileged investment.
Part I of this paper discusses the history between the
United States and Cuba. In order to understand the current
economic condition in Cuba and the lack of compensation to
owners of expropriated property, it is essential to take a look
back at the events that built up to the status of current
relations between the two countries. Before long,
compensation will emerge as a central issue in newly
normalized US-Cuban relations.
Part II will take a look at Eastern Europe and evaluate
the restoration schemes implemented by other post-socialist
and post-communist countries. This Part will look to East
Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia for restitution
models and to Poland and Hungary for compensation
models. Part III of this paper then goes on to make the
argument for privileged investment in Cuba as a form of
compensation for owners of expropriated property rather
than the previous two models.
Part IV will then apply the schemes of compensation,
restitution, and privileged investment to Cuba while looking
to the countries of Eastern Europe in order to evaluate and
form a suggestion as to the best model for Cuba. Part V
recommends that, for the most effective resolution of the
property claims of Cuban and U.S. claimants, privileged
investment would be the wisest choice of the three schemes
in order to ensure that claimants receive some sort of
compensation while also providing the Cuban government
the opportunity to rebuild its economy. The privileged
investment schemes are the best recipe for success for both
countries involved.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CUBA
Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries defeated the
government led by Fulgencio Batista.3 In 1960, the revolution
enacted the Urban Housing Reform of October 14, 1960 that
abruptly transferred property rights from former owners to
tenants.4 Also, residencies belonging to those who fled Cuba
were declared abandoned and redistributed to constituents.5
The Cuban government seized a lot of real and personal
citizens and others within the first decade of the revolution.6
The Castro government expropriated all property owned by
United States citizens and corporations. 7 Castro used the
3 John J. Coughlin, Cuban Foreign Investment Act: Opportunities For United
States Corporations in a Post-Embargo Era, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
299, 301 (1999).
4 Richard E. Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba:




7 John J. Coughlin, Cuban Foreign Investment Act: Opportunities For United
States Corporations in a Post-Embargo Era, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
299, 301 (1999).
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properties as a way to consolidate power.8 The government
monopolized wealth and income while at the same time
depriving opponents of resources. 9 In 1961, a group of
Cuban exiles, armed by the US, were defeated by the Cuban
military at the Bay of Pigs while attempting to overthrow the
Castro government.10 After the failed attempt at the Bay of
Pigs, the United States ended diplomatic relations with Cuba
and imposed a trade embargo.11
Relations between the United States and Cuba
continued to deteriorate, and tensions between the two
countries reached their peak in 1962 when the Soviet Union
placed nuclear weapons in Cuba.12 The Cuban Missile Crisis
further worsened the tensions between the United States and
Cuba. As a result, the United States continued to tighten the
embargo against Cuba and attempted to remove Fidel
8 Richard E. Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba:
Transforming Trauma into Opportunity, BROOKINGS PUBLICATIONS ON CUBA
1 (December 2015).
9 Id.
10 U.S.-Cuban Relations – Council of Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 (last visited Feb.
15, 2016).
11 Id.
12 John J. Coughlin, Cuban Foreign Investment Act: Opportunities For United
States Corporations in a Post-Embargo Era, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
299, 301 (1999).
2016 CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY RESTORATION 165
Castro from power and replace his communist regime with a
friendly government.13 Fidel Castro has been succeeded by
his brother, Raul Castro, who shows no indication of any
intention that he will voluntarily relinquish power in favor
of a non-communist government.14
The United States had held firm its policy of replacing
Castro with a different government. In more recent years,
inertia rather than commitment has driven policy. Finally, in
2015 the United States began talks of lifting the long-
standing embargo, and reigniting United States and Cuban
relations.
B. NATIONALIZATION AND VALUATION OF U.S. ASSETS IN
CUBA
The Cuban government nationalized most U.S.
owned assets on the island. These properties included the
telephone system, most of the mining industry, oil refineries,
bottling plants, warehouses, and over two million acres of
land. 15 The nationalizations carried out by Fidel Castro’s
regime were the largest uncompensated taking of American
13 Id. at 302.
14 Id. at 303.
15 Cuban Claims, http://www.certifiedcubanclaims.org/faqs.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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property by a foreign government in history.16 The United
States initially did not oppose the takings of agricultural
land, stressing that adequate and effective compensation be
given to land owners.17 The Cuban government responded
and recognized that it had an obligation under Cuban law to
provide prompt and adequate compensation but stated that
it had the right to delay any compensation due to the
country’s weak economic and financial situation. 18 The
government chose to provide compensation in the form of
bonds.19
The value of the bonds was calculated based on the
declared tax value of the property taken.20 This worked to
the government’s advantage because the value of the land
was based on the owners’ own prior assessment for tax
purposes.21 The declared values were thus very low, and the
amount calculated for the bonds did not create a burden on
the public budget. In 1964, the U.S. Congress created the
16 Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and




19 Id. at 415.
20 Id. at 416.
21 Id.
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Cuban Claims Program, which authorized the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission to consider claims of U.S.
nationals against the Cuban government.22 The Commission
received 8,816 claims, of which 87% were from individual
Cuban immigrants and non-Cuban American owners.23 The
Cuban Claims Program certified 5,911 of these claims,
totaling $1.8 billion.24 In order to get claims certified, the
claimant had to submit documentary evidence regarding the
confiscated property so as to prove value. Any and all
findings by the Commission were certified to the Secretary
of State for use in possible future negotiations.25
The Cuban government has never repudiated the
U.S. claims, but it has consistently stated that it does not
recognize the property claims of Cuban exiles in the United
States. 26 Since the nationalization of property owned by
one’s own citizens is permitted, Cuba only recognizes its
obligation to provide compensation to U.S. nationals under
international law. It does refuse to recognize, however, the
22 Cuban Claims, http://www.certifiedcubanclaims.org/faqs.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and
Likely Settlement Mechanisms, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 413, 417
(2009).
26 Id. at 418.
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valuation or the interest allowance set by the Commission.27
The Cuban government believes that the nationalization it
carried out after 1959 is not considered confiscation because
it considers nationalization to be an act stemming from an
economic claim that the property is needed for public utility,
popular benefit, and is to be accompanied by appropriate
compensation under the Cuban Constitution.28
III. SURVEY OF RESTORATION SCHEMES
This section will analyze countries of Eastern Europe
in order to study and evaluate schemes used for restoration
by post-socialist and post-communist countries.
A. EAST GERMANY
In 1989, Germany took down the Berlin Wall, ousted
communist leaders, and ended the German Democratic
Republic.29 These events led to the Unification Treaty that
ended the post-war division imposed on Germany by the
Allies as retribution. 30 Unified Germany emerged as a
dominant actor in Europe because of West Germany’s
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 125 (1995).
30 Id.
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economic and legal infrastructure, which facilitated
successful filing of claims for restitution or compensation by
owners deprived of their property.31
Even though there were many successful filing of
claims, some former owners were affected by the Joint
Declaration, which is the basis for statutory guidelines
regarding property restitution and compensation claims.
The Joint Declaration stated that confiscations that were
carried out as a result of the Soviet occupation law were no
longer reversible and the authority to compensate was
reserved to the Parliament.32 According to the Property Law
in Germany, any property of which a former owner has been
deprived by state acts, which include transferring property
to state ownership or transferring ownership to a third party
with insufficient compensation to the owner, is to be
returned to the owner or is successors.33 This law applies to
real estate, chattels, claims for payment of money, equity
interests, and ownership in branches of companies outside
of the German Democratic Republic.34 Under the Property
31 Id.
32 Id. at 126.
33 M. Gruson & G. Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the Former
German Democratic Republic, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 540, 544 (1990).
34 Id.
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Law, German companies and foreign owners are also
allowed to file claims for restitution and/or compensation.35
Former owners may opt to relinquish claims and
demand compensation; however, the Property Law does not
dictate how the compensation will be computed and how
the compensation fund would be created.36 In cases where
the owner requested that the property be reconveyed,
proving ownership was often complicated due to lost and
war time destruction.37 However, where reconveyance was
successful, owners were compensated for any decreases in
the value of property, and in some cases, owners were given
compensation payments or substitute property and are
barred from demanding reconveyance.38
East Germany preferred to follow a compensation
model, when possible, in order to satisfy claims from former
property owners. Absent a few exceptions where properties
were repurposed for the public good or properties were
repurchased in good faith from other actors, East Germany
made attempts to right the old property wrongs created by
both the Nazi regime and Soviet-era nationalization. In 1994,
35 Id.
36 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 127-128 (1995).
37 Id. at 128.
38 Id.
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the Bundestag approved a property compensation law
establishing an “expropriation compensation fund.”39 The
fund would have a volume of dm 20 billion.40 Compensation
payments vary from type of asset, and the basis would be
the 1935 standard value multiplied by a factor of between 1.5
and 2.0 depending on the asset.41 The compensation would
be in the form of government notes, which would mature in
2004 and be redeemable in five equal annual installments by
2010.42
B. CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
The Czech Republic and Slovakia have been the most
generous when faced with takings issues resulting from the
communist era. These nations made it a practice to return
confiscated private property to its legitimate former
owners. 43 Prior to World War II, Czechoslovakia was a
thriving capitalistic economy until taken over and pillaged
by Nazi Germany. When Czechoslovakia fell under
39 The Lectric Law Library, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/int08.htm




43 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 121 (1995).
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communist rule after World War II, the communist
government nationalized practically all privately held
businesses above a certain size or value and made them into
state enterprises or cooperatives.44
The First Restitution Act in 1990 provided for the
return of any property taken by the communist state to their
original owners.45 The act covered only a small portion of
confiscated property, mainly individually-owned businesses
in the service sector, and provided for the return of these
businesses to their original owners. 46 Compensation was
only implemented where restitution was no longer possible
because of property destruction.
The Second Restitution Act in 1991 allowed for the
return of, or compensation for, taken property with an
aggregate value in excess of $10.7 billion. 47 The act
authorized the return of private property that was taken
during the communist period, which lasted from 1948 to the
end of 1989. 48 Companies and other legal entities were
44 Id. at 122.
45 V. Pechota, Privatization and Foreign Investment in Czechoslovakia:
The Legal Dimension, 24 VAND.J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 309-310 (1991).
46 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 122 (1995).
47 Id. at 123.
48 Id.
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excluded from the act. In the event of a dispute, the act
provided that the case be sent to a court where if the
property could not be returned, there would be cash
compensation paid through government-issued bonds.49 The
amount would be limited to 30,000 Czech crowns in cash
with the rest of the amount covered by the bonds.50 The
monetary valuation of property was typically limited to
parcels under 150 hectares for non-agricultural land and 250
hectares for agricultural land. 51 Under the Second
Restitution Act, the benefits only applied to resident
citizens.52
The Czech Republic and Slovakia have instituted a
system where before a state enterprise, legal entities that
undertake commercial activities on behalf of the owner
government, is privatized, the records of the registry of
deeds must be examined in order to ensure that there is no
49 Id. at 124.
50 The Czech and Slovak Law of Restitution,
http://www.heinzlegal.com/publik_vortraege/pub_download/speech
es/CzechSlovakLaw.pdf (last visited April 24, 2016).
51 Id.
52 V. Pechota, Privatization and Foreign Investment in Czechoslovakia:
The Legal Dimension, 24 VAND.J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 311 (1991).
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private owner.53 Only if there is no valid claim after six
months from the investigation will the privatization of the
state enterprise be allowed to continue. Currently, the right
to own property is recognized for residents, and foreigners
can only hold real property interests indirectly.54
C. POLAND
The spark that began the liberation of Central and
Eastern Europe began in Poland when the Solidarity trade
union organized opposition to communist rule.55 Since the
return of private capitalism, Poland has been trying
privatize its economy. Poland’s President and its parliament
sponsored reprivatization legislation that would compensate
people whose property was taken with legal compensation
by the state.56 Former landowners may file lawsuits in order
53 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 124 (1995).
54 Matias F. Travieso-Diaza and Stephan M. Bleisteiner, Some Lessons for
Cuba From the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L 173,
189 (1995).
55 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 125 (1995).
56 Id. at 135.
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to attempt to regain land, but must do so at their own
expense.57
The Polish government decided to follow a
compensation model rather than a restitution model. Poland
planned to compensate owners whose land was taken
between 1944 and 1960.58 Under this model, capital bonds
would enable former owners to purchase shares in state
enterprises being privatized.59 The only method for former
owners to regain their property would be to pay the state in
cash the market value of real estate. The only properties that
would be returned to their former owners would be
chemists’ shops, forests, and estates.60
The reprivatization statute only applies to individuals
of Polish nationality or residence. These individuals must be
able to prove that they are former owners or descendants of
former owners of confiscated industrial or agricultural fixed
assets.61 Poles that are living abroad are eligible for physical
57 Id.
58 G. Douglas Harper, Restitution of Property in Cuba: Lessons Learned from
East Europe, ASCE 408, 416 (1999), http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/v09-harper.pdf.
59 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 125 (1995).
60Id.
61 Id. at 136.
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24176
restitution or compensation in the form of bonds only if they
adopt Polish citizenship and return to Poland.62 In order to
eliminate the uncertainty caused by the lack of clear title to
property, the Polish legislation intends to lure more foreign
investment. The government has claimed that both
restitution and compensation must be limited because of
Poland’s poor cash status and need for foreign investment in
order to bring in revenues. 63 The government has asked
former owners to write off the balance of their claims as a
“patriotic donation.”64
D. HUNGARY
Communist Hungary moved in the direction of
property privatization economic liberalization even before
1989, and this background accelerated the transition to a free
market economy. This transition included the compensation
of former owners of property confiscated by the communist
regime. The Hungarian Parliament passed the “Law to
Provide Partial Compensation for Unjust Damage Caused by
the State to the Property of Citizens.”65 This was designed to
62 Z. Slupinski, Polish Privatization Law of 1990, 1990 INT'L BUS. L. 456,
458.
63 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 138 (1995).
64 Id. at 139.
65 Id. at 130.
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partially reestablish private property rights without
delaying privatization.
The legislation, however, does not return confiscated
property, but it does provide for compensation in the form
of interest bearing certificates that may be used to buy state-
owned property, businesses, or shares in businesses. 66
Former owners have priority with this law, but foreigners
also have access to these certificates. Foreigners are
protected under the Foreign Investment Act of 1988.67 The
compensation act provides for compensations of up to
200,000 forints or $2,700 for each small property and
compensation is not to exceed 5 million forints or $67,500 for
each large property.68
IV. ARGUMENT FOR PRIVILEGED INVESTMENT
Cuba has realized the need for foreign investment in
order to help fix the economic void that was created as a
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
subsidies to Cuba.69 Foreign investment occurs when “a firm
66 Id. at 131.
67 Matias F. Travieso-Diaza and Stephan M. Bleisteiner, Some Lessons for
Cuba From the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L 173,
188 (1995).
68 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 133 (1995).
69 Id.
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invests directly in facilities to produce and/or market a
product in a foreign country.”70 Investors make this type of
investment with an “equitable profit motive.”71
When dealing with the transfer of money from
foreign direct investments, the state must adopt a regulatory
scheme, which can be considered in three categories: the
classical theory, the dependency theory, and the middle
path.72 The classical theory states that “foreign investment is
wholly beneficial to the host” economy.73 The dependency
theory proposes that “foreign investment will not bringing
meaningful economic development,” and it argues that
foreign investment creates a dependency on the actors of
developing countries.74 Lastly, the middle path argues that




72 Id. at 114.
73 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 48
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1994).
74 Id. at 53.
75 J. Michael Taylor, The United States’ Prohibition on Foreign Direct
Investment in Cuba-Enough Already?!?, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 111, 114
(2002).
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Looking to the history of foreign direct investment
between the United States and Cuba, the Cuban government
believed in the dependency theory and, therefore, rejected
foreign direct investment. 76 The problem with Cuba
choosing to follow a dependency theory approach to foreign
direct investment at the time of the revolution was that the
United States was a firm believer of the application of the
classical theory for foreign direct investment.77 The conflict
resulted in the loss of foreign direct investment from the
United States, which is estimated to have been about $774
million, resulting in quite the loss.78
The investment relationship between Cuba and the
United States changed with the Castro revolution.79 Cuba
adopted Laws 890 and 891, which led to the nationalization
of foreign investments and private enterprises in accordance
with socialist principles.80 These socialist ideals were directly
supported by the Soviet Union; however, when the Soviet
Union dissolved, the aid to Cuba ended, and Cuba’s
76 Id. at 115.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 116.
79 Id.
80 Venera A. Gallousis, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair with Foreign
Investment: the Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEX. HISPANIC J.L. & POL'Y 81,
84 (Spring 2001).
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economy was struck hard.81 Thereafter, Cuba began to court
international investment in order to ease the blow of the
decline in aid.82 Cuba enacted Law 50 in 1982 in order to
permit the creation of joint ventures; however, the law
proved unsuccessful in attracting foreign investment due to
the restrictions on the ownership of private property.83
In response to the lack of aid drawn in by Law 50,
Cuba repealed it and enacted Law 77 in 1995, which slightly
modified the labor provisions that were enacted in Law 50.84
It also bolstered the provisions for foreign investment,
including the recognition of private property and permitting
100 percent foreign capital companies. 85 Under Law 77,
foreign investment in Cuba can be made as part of a joint
venture or through an entirely foreign capital currency.86
81 J. Michael Taylor, The United States’ Prohibition on Foreign Direct
Investment in Cuba-Enough Already?!?, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 111, 117
(2002).
82 Id.
83 Venera A. Gallousis, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair with Foreign
Investment: the Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEX. HISPANIC J.L. & POL'Y 81,
92 (Spring 2001).
84 Id. at 95.
85 Id.
86 J. Michael Taylor, The United States’ Prohibition on Foreign Direct
Investment in Cuba-Enough Already?!?, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 111, 118
(2002).
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Investments can only be made if authorized; therefore,
control over investment lies in the hands of the Cuban
government. 87 In response to the mass expropriation of
property, the United States began its economic embargo
against Cuba in 1960, and later codified it in 1992 as the
Cuban Democracy Act.88 The Act empowered the President
to apply limited sanctions to any country assisting the
Cuban government, stated that the President should
encourage other countries to restrict their trade with Cuba,
limited the export of food, medicine, and other medical
supplies to Cuba from the United States, and set up foreign
relations policies for a potential transition to a free market
economy in Cuba. 89 In 1996, the investment prohibitions
were codified and extended by Congress with the passage of
the Helms-Burton Act, which introduced a secondary
boycott provision to the existing boycott.
The Helms-Burton Act drew international attention
and criticism because it intended to create penalties against
87 Venera A. Gallousis, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair with Foreign
Investment: the Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEX. HISPANIC J.L. & POL'Y 81,
86 (Spring 2001).
88 J. Michael Taylor, The United States’ Prohibition on Foreign Direct
Investment in Cuba-Enough Already?!?, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 111, 119
(2002).
89 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C.A §§ 6003(a) (West Supp.
2002).
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persons for trafficking in confiscated property.90 The stated
goals of the Helms-Burton Act are to assist the Cuban people
in regaining freedom, to strengthen sanctions against the
Castro government, to encourage democratic elections in
Cuba, to provide a policy framework for the United States in
the event the Cuba transitioned to a free market economy,
and to protect United States nationals from confiscatory
takings by the Castro government.91 Title II of the Helms-
Burton Act restricts the extension of “loan, credit, or other
financing” by the U.S. to any person for the purpose of
involving financing transactions of taken property, unless
the financing is approved by the U.S. national that owned
the property. 92 Titles III and IV extend regulatory
prohibition to investment activities of those outside the
United States. 93 It allows U.S. nationals to seek damages
against any person that traffics in property.94 However, the
effectiveness of the cause of action has been suspended,
90 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091.
91 Id. § 6022.
92 Id. § 6033.
93 J. Michael Taylor, The United States’ Prohibition on Foreign Direct
Investment in Cuba-Enough Already?!?, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 111, 120
(2002).
94 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(I).
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therefore, preventing the initiation of lawsuits. 95 Title IV
explicitly states that any foreign nationals that have
confiscated or trafficked in confiscated property are denied
entry into the United States. 96 With the Act, Congress
intended to chill investment in Cuba by exposing investors
to a liability scheme. 97 Ultimately, the Helms-Burton Act
sought to suffocate Cuba by rendering it unable to trade.
V. APPLICATION OF RESTORATION SCHEMES TO CUBA
A. EAST GERMAN MODEL
It was the belief of many that East Germany was the
closest example of what a post communist Cuba could look
like.98 However, there are a number of differences between
the two countries that would make the East German Model
for Restitution inapplicable to Cuba.
95 Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law
and Its Antidotes: A Classic Standoff? 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 95, 105-6
(2000).
96 22 U.S.C. § 6091.
97 J. Michael Taylor, The United States’ Prohibition on Foreign Direct
Investment in Cuba-Enough Already?!?, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 111, 122
(2002).
98 G. Douglas Harper, Restitution of Property in Cuba: Lessons Learned from
East Europe, ASCE 408, 416 (1999), http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/v09-harper.pdf.
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When Germany reunited, Germany was an economic
superpower, unlike Cuba, which would be in a very poor
economic state in the event of a transition away from a
statist economy. 99 The German programs that were
implemented to deal with expropriated property were made
under the assumption that Germany would be able to absorb
the losses associated with the Compensation Model.100 Cuba
is considerably poorer and is not in the same economic
position to handle compensation as East Germany did.
If the Cuban government were to choose
compensation instead of restitution, the government could
be overlooking an avenue of economic growth. Many local
Cubans will be inevitably laid off from their jobs since
expatriate Cubans may lose interest in seeing their
companies restored.101 It seems that returning land to former
owners and local Cubans would create more of a chance for
economic growth and a vested interest in the island and its
progress. Expatriate Cubans may restore their companies
and create jobs for many local Cubans. In creating more jobs,
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B. CZECH AND SLOVAKIAN MODEL
The Czechoslovakian plan would only be useful to
Cuba to a limited extent.102 The Cuban government could
use the same time limit instituted by the Czechoslovakian
model where after the expiration former owners cannot
receive either restitution or compensation.103 The expiration
time set by the Czechoslovakian government was only six
months.104 The Cuban government would be able to offer
title of property to foreign investors in that way and
encourage investment.105 Once the expiry time limit has past,
the Cuban government would not have to fear former
owners trying to claim property. Also, since the
Czechoslovakian plan revolved around returning property
to former owners rather than compensation, the Cuban
government would save money by not having to
compensate former owners and rather receive foreign
investment money for the property in their possession. They
102 Id. at 419.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 417.
105 Id. at 419.
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would be able to put that money toward other ways to
promote economic development.106
The Acts instituted by Czechoslovakia do not
discourage redevelopment. 107 The Cuban government can
allow former owners living abroad to rebuild on confiscated
property, and the money spent could be filtered back into
the economy and encourage the development of a middle
class.
This model, however, does appear to have a
limitation of benefits to individuals.108 Due to the exclusion
of legal entities, such as corporations, from receiving
restitution, the Cuban government would have to continue
to pay expenses associated with state enterprises. 109 The
government would lose a share of the profits from the sale of
the enterprise, making it better for the government to get rid
of the burden and allow for the restitution to foreign
entities.110 Investors could make state enterprises into profit
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C. POLISH MODEL
Applying the Polish model of compensation to Cuba,
could prove to be problematic. In the Polish model for
compensation, Poles that live abroad are eligible for
restitution or compensation in the form of state bonds, but
only if the adopt Polish citizenship and return to Poland
permanently.112 Therefore, if applied to Cuba that would
mean that expatriate Cubans and Cuban-Americans would
be forced to adopt Cuban citizenship and return to Cuba
permanently in order to receive any kind of compensation or
restitution.113 This part of the Polish model is problematic
and would likely have the effect of discouraging investment
in Cuba since it is unlikely that expatriate Cubans and
Cuban-Americans would be willing to return to Cuba
permanently. As for those that would be willing to return to
Cuba, they may not be willing to do so immediately. 114
Those that are willing to return may choose to wait until
there is stability and ready availability of things such as
112 Z. Slupinski, Polish Privatization Law of 1990, 1990 INT'L BUS. L. 456,
458.
113 G. Douglas Harper, Restitution of Property in Cuba: Lessons Learned from
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content/uploads/2014/09/v09-harper.pdf.
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electricity, water, and other facilities rather than return to an
immediate post-communist Cuba.115 Overall, it seems that
limiting restitution and compensation to those willing to
come back to Cuba does not seem like a good idea in the
long-term for the redevelopment of the island.
Another problem that would come of forcing people
to relocate back to Cuba would be a strain on residential
property given lack of adequate housing. 116 Former
residential property owners who are forced to move back
will want to recover their own confiscated residential
properties.117 However, returning this property would lead
to the forced removal of thousands from existing housing.
Cuba would be forced to face instant homelessness and an
economic meltdown as a result of the policy. 118 Finally,
because of Cuba’s economic situation, the country would not
be able to afford to provide a mass compensation to those
with confiscated property.
D. HUNGARIAN MODEL
Hungarian law focuses on compensation and did not
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takes form of government issued interest-bearing certificates
that could be used to buy state owned property, businesses,
or shares of business, and there was no restriction on the
selling of certificates to foreigners. 120 This system could
prove to be problematic for Cuba because of the poor
economic status that post-communist Cuba would face.
Many expatriates who thought of returning to reclaim any
rural holdings would find that their attempts would be
stifled because of this model.121 This would negatively affect
the economy because it is removing the parties that are the
most capable and most willing to invest in Cuba. 122 In
isolating expatriates, the result would be a high degree of
foreign ownership because the government would sell
unclaimed state-owned assets.123
E. PRIVILEGED INVESTMENT
120 Nicolas J. Guiterrez, Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI. Y.B. INT’L
L 111, 131 (1995).
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After the international debt crisis of the 1980s a trend
developed where the debt owed by a developing country
was converted into an equity investment in the debtor
country.124 These programs were initially developed to help
Latin American countries reduce debt and increase foreign
investment. 125 In order to convert debt into equity, a third
party investor would buy the debt at a discount on the
secondary market, and the debtor government would
redeem the debt at a negotiated value.126 The funds would
then be invested in equity.127
This sort of investment could serve as an alternate
option for settling the U.S. certified property claims in light
of progress with the relationship between the U.S. and
Cuba. 128 This option would not only benefit Cuba
economically, but also provide Cuba with an influx of
foreign investment and capital.129 In order for this option to
124 Megan Elizabeth Haas, Tierra Sin Dueños: The Effect of Cuba’s Foreign
Investment Scheme on United States’ Certified Property Claims, 15 TEX. HISP.
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work Cuba must settle the U.S. claims in one form or
another.
In this system, Cuba would determine the value of the
individual property claims and convert the debt into an
equity interest in a joint venture company.130 They could do
this the same way as it was done in East Germany where
they took standard value of the property at the time of
expropriation and then multiplied by a factor depending on
the asset.131 The U.S. company, either representing the U.S.
government or private claimants, would avoid taxes on the
compensation until the shares are sold for cash, however if
the company receives dividends, then it will pay taxes on the
compensation.132 In this system, Cuba would not have to pay
anything in hard currency and the U.S. would receive the
equivalent of cash with the potential to recover more in
future dividends and sale of its interest.
The downside to this system would be that this might
not be the form of compensation that claimants would have
wished for.133 Since there is no guaranty that Cuba could
become capitalistic, the shareholders would be bound by
130 Id.
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Cuban law, which involves more government oversight.134
Cuba would also be relinquishing a lot of control over to its
foreign investors. Even with its downsides, debt conversions
and investment could be what is needed to solve the
problems related to compensation and restitution of U.S.
property claims in Cuba while increasing foreign investment
and helping Cuba’s economy.135
VI. CONCLUSION
A post-communist Cuba would have to make
decisions about how to deal with U.S. certified property
claims if there are to be more than mere expectations
towards building a relationship between the two countries.
When approaching the issue, a post-communist Cuba will
have to decide whether it will reconvey property,
compensate, or even try the alternative by converting debt
into equity and allowing for investment, perhaps privileging
the most directly dispossessed.
In examining all models, it seems that restitution
would not be a practical option due to the risk of mass
homelessness that would face those who have occupied
dwellings for decades and an economic meltdown caused by
the turmoil. Any attempt at compensation in cash would
hardly be feasible and unfair given the impoverished state of
Cuba’s economy. It seems that the best scenario for a post-
134 Id.
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communist Cuba therefore would be to convert debt to
equity and open its doors to foreign investors.
Investment in Cuba could prove to be extremely
attractive as relations between Cuba and the U.S. are
repaired. The opportunity for real estate development and
tourism-centered projects could make Cuba a very lucrative
new investment for foreign investors. The participation of
foreign investors would also benefit Cuba, since its economy
is weak and in need of capital infusion. Settlement of
property claims between the U.S. and Cuba is imperative
politically and morally in order for progress to take place.
Fostering economic growth through investment could create
an opportunity for growth for Cuba and justice and a way
forward for property claimants.
